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Abstract 
 
 
An argument is developed that suggests the concept of affordances can best facilitate the pursuit of new 
knowledge if it’s defined as an event. The first description initially generated by James J. Gibson was 
deceptively vague. This has led to several attempts by additional researchers to re-describe it. These 
efforts fall short of describing a concept that is consistent with both the historical context of Gibson’s 
work and his motivations for introducing the term. Additionally, no definition has been introduced that 
aims to limit the scope of information researchers must consider when using the term. I put forth a 
description of affordances that is consistent with Gibson’s motivations and is pragmatically motivated to 
restrain the scope of inquiry. The application of this new description may lead to more fruitful 
experimentation and less problematic discourse throughout the disciplines that use the term. 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction of a New Term to Science 
 
James J. Gibson (1979) introduced the concept of “affordances” to psychology—the 
noun version of the verb to afford. However, he did not construct a complete 
description for it during his lifetime. Not unlike the subsequent literature on 
affordances, his concept and its use evolved. Without an explicit description of his new 
term, he failed to delineate its size and scope in a way that was optimal for scientific 
research, and its incompleteness may be charitable to usage of the term that Gibson 
may not have intended.  
 
Traditionally, the motivation for introducing a new term to science is to guide inquiry. 
We would not talk of electrons, radio waves, or the biological cell if the knowledge to 
be gained by doing so was nil. By exploring Gibson’s motivations for introducing the 
term; the objects that it may refer to; the evolving definitions he used to describe them; 
and the historical context that accompanied his work; we may avail ourselves to the 
direction his finger was pointing, not simply where it was at, in order to navigate the 
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relevant literature and assist with delineating a description that is most beneficial to 
scientific research. 
 
2. Gibson’s Affordances, Motivations, and Historical context 
 
Gibson’s first attempt to describe affordance was vague. He states “The affordances of 
the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for 
good or ill” (Gibson, 1979, p. 127). It’s difficult not to assume this is referring to 
something or some property that exists out in the environment. However, he claims that 
what he meant for the term was “something that refers to both the environment and the 
animal in a way that no existing term does” (p. 127). This was a critical move on the 
behalf of Gibson because it reflects an attempt to eliminate the possibility for 
affordances to refer something we already have a term to describe, and to do it in a way 
that no other term does—it is parsimonious and must do new work. Gibson follows 
with a longer theoretical description of his new term: 
 
An affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; or it is 
both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-
objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the 
environment and a fact of behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet 
neither. An affordance points both ways, to the environment and to the observer 
(129). 
 
What kind of entity points in two directions? How can any entity be both subjective and 
objective? How can something be two different things, yet also neither? Reed (1988) 
describes a young Gibson as a man who rejected the majority of psychological research 
during his time and chose to develop his own approach that he called an ecological 
approach to psychology. The fundamental difference between Gibson’s approach and 
others’ was that he was concerned with understanding an organism’s behavior in an 
environmental context. And though his path veered from the psychological research of 
his time, he remained enthusiastic for experimentation and relied heavily on it to 
support his theories (Gibson, 1958, 1962, 1963, & 1979).  
 
There are three crucial insights to be gleaned from knowledge about Gibson’s life work 
with respect to what he intended his new term to refer to. First, the ecological approach 
to psychology sets its sights on behavior within the animal-environment system (AES) 
as the fundamental object of inquiry. Second, he claims that we can perceive is what is 
real; and perception for Gibson was direct, therefor direct perception must be accounted 
for. Direct perception has since been a ubiquitous concept throughout the empirical data 
related to affordances (e.g., Mark, 1987; Riccio & Stroffregen, 1988; Warren, 1984; & 
Warren and Wang, 1987). Third, the emphasis on experimentation suggests that there 
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should be some way to measure them or use them in experiments to acquire new 
knowledge. 
 
3. Postliminary Ontologies 
 
Reed (1996) claims that affordances are objects in the environment that have the 
property of being a resource that can be exploited by an animal. Reed links his 
description to evolutionary theory, and wants a description of affordances that refers to 
something in the environment that exerts selection pressure on animals. Affordances, 
then, are resources in the environment that exist independently of any animal that may 
come to perceive them.  
 
Turvey (1992) contrasts this view by providing a description of affordances that is 
motivated by physics as opposed to biology. He claims that they are physical 
dispositions of objects in the environment, dispositions that in some circumstances 
manifest properties that can be perceived by animals. The property of being an edible 
exists if animals exist that can eat it. Furthermore, affordances have to be real 
possibilities and also be complimented by the physical dispositions of the animals. He 
uses the term effectivity to refer to the dispositional properties of the animal. Under this 
description, affordances are not invariant features of the environment; rather, they come 
into and out of existence when the complimentary dispositions of the affordance and 
the effectivity co-exist. Therefore, he argues they are emergent phenomena. 
 
Stroffregen (2000) and Michaels (2000) support Turvey’s view that affordances are an 
animal-referential concept. However, Stroffregen (2003) later alters his description by 
claiming that they do not exist out in the environment. Also, motivating Stroffregen’s 
(2000) work were the arguments made by Bingham (2000) where he claimed that 
affordances may be properties of events. Stroffregen rejects this idea on the grounds 
that affordances exist independently of an event. For example, the ratio of a person’s 
leg length to the height of a step is an entity that exists independent of any event. He 
goes on to describe affordances as emergent properties of the animal-environment 
system (AES). Appealing to the widespread agreement that the discipline of ecological 
psychology posits behavior in the AES as the unit of analysis, this description 
motivates the need for a candidate definition that positions the affordance in the context 
of the AES. Reed and Turvey’s descriptions failed to meet this standard. He explains 
that the constituents of a system will have their own properties, and that the systems 
that are made up of these constituents also have a unique set of properties; the latter are 
emergent properties. To illustrate, he asks that we imagine a triangle drawn out on 
paper. The lines that constitute the triangle have their own properties such as length, 
width, and straightness. When combined, they form a triangle that has the emergent 
property of having a quantifiable area, in addition to possibly being either acute, obtuse, 
or equilateral. This description of emergence places the context of affordances at the 
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level of the AES that differs qualitatively from the properties of the environment or the 
animal in isolation; and it excludes from consideration anything that cannot have 
consequences for action.  
 
Chemero (2011) claimed that affordances are not properties at all; instead, he claims 
they are relations. To defeat the claims that affordances are properties, he makes a case 
that the type of perception involved with perceiving an affordance is one that involves 
perceiving the situation as a whole. He distinguishes his type of perception as feature 
placing rather than property perceptions. For example, to perceive that my mirror is 
dirty is to perceive a property that requires (a) perceiving the mirror; (b) perceiving that 
it is mine; (c) knowledge of what it means to be dirty; and (d) infer that this is my 
mirror that I am perceiving that has the property of being perceived. In contrast, to 
perceive that it is snowing outside is simply to recognize a feature of your current 
situation. This is akin to what it is like to perceive an affordance. Consider a ball 
kicking affordance. When the ball is near and in a position for us to kick, we directly 
perceive that it is time to extend the leg. This is to perceive that the situation has a 
feature that allows for a specific action as opposed to the perception of a specific 
property. Thus, Chemero describes affordances as a perceivable relation between the 
animal and the environment. Moreover, Chemero’s concept of an affordance does not 
disappear when there is no local animal to perceive it, but the affordance does depend 
on the existence of an animal that can perceive it. He has narrowed down the ontology 
of affordance to a relation that holds between the complementary physical disposition 
of the environment and the animal, and this relationship need not be perceived or acted 
upon in order to exist. 
 
4. Delineating Scope 
 
The differentiation of affordance ontologies above illustrates that each has their own 
position on the narrow to broad spectrum with respect to scope. The aforementioned 
descriptions of affordance are accompanied by three concerns regarding their 
implications on the scope of inquiry: (1) is it located in the environment, in the animal, 
both, or neither; (2) if it consists of multiple structures, which ones and in what way are 
they related; and (3) if they can be perceived or acted upon, do they have to be in order 
to exist? 
 
Some (e.g., Reed, 1996; Shaw et al., 1982; & Michaels, 2000 & 2003) claim that 
affordances are properties of the environment that animals can perceive. For Reed 
(1996) they are dispositional properties of the environment that always exist; stair 
affords stepping on even if there is no animal present to step on it. A term also 
introduced along with these descriptions is effectivity. An effectivity refers to the 
dispositional properties of the organism that are complimented by an affordance.  For 
Shaw, Turvey, and Mace (1982) affordances are properties of the environment relevant 
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to the body of an animal and exist when an animal that has an effectivity to act on them 
exists. While some have convincingly argued against these descriptions before (e.g., 
Chemero, 2011), their impact on the scope of investigation has not been addressed. 
 
If affordances are properties of the environment that afford acting upon based on the 
effectivities of animals and can exist independent of any animal, then the scope of 
investigation for affordances includes everything in nature. However, we use the 
instruments of physics to measure the dispositional properties of nature. Contrary to 
Gibson’s goal of referring to something new regarding the animal and the environment, 
this description encompasses all the objects we already know. It doesn’t refer to 
anything new and doesn’t introduce any new knowledge. Moreover, if affordances are 
dispositional properties of the environment, then they can be studied without 
considering the behavior of animals, neglecting the target of inquiry involved with 
affordances. It is also not clear what is intended when the environment is mentioned. 
Does an uninhabitable planet count as a part of my environment and afford lying down 
on? These descriptions deal with superfluous amounts of information that can be 
accounted for, and are supplemented by ambiguity of the terms comprising them. These 
descriptions should be rejected on the grounds that they neglect the logic of and 
Gibson’s appeal to parsimony, in addition to offering far too broad of a scope for 
researchers to consider. 
 
Some who argued against the descriptions of affordances as properties of the 
environment also responded by claiming that they are properties of the AES (e.g., 
Gibson, 1979, Chemero, 2003; & Stroffregen 2003). Here, an affordance is a property 
of a system that consists of two substances—the animal and the environment. Gibson’s 
description falls into this category since he claimed what he meant for the term was 
“something that referred to both the environment and the animal in a way that no 
existing term did before” (Gibson, 1979). For Stroffregen (2003), affordances were 
“emergent” properties of the AES and for Chemero (2011), they were relations. 
Whether or not they’re properties of the environment or relations that hold between it 
and an animal, these descriptions allow for a study of affordances that need not 
concerned with behavior. For example, we saw Stroffregen (2000) claim that the ratio 
of a person’s leg length to the height of a stair as a thing in itself that referred to as an 
affordance. From the descriptions he puts forward, the ratio affords acting upon by the 
animal and fits his description of affordances. This is problematic in the context of 
Gibson’s affordances in that this information can be acquired with complete 
indifference to the behavior of an animal. Take a measurement of something in the 
environment and compare it to a measurement of an animal, calculate the ratio, and you 
have an affordance. Not only does this not capture Gibson’s concern with behavior, 
direct perception, or refer to something new (it is concerned with physical 
measurements with respect to the concept that had existed long before him—ratios) but 
it still leaves the scope of inquiry at the level of everything in nature—though it re-
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emphasizes the need to target the animal. The question arises: If I am making 
measurements of the environment and animals, am I doing psychology or physics? 
 
There is also a temporal problem with these descriptions; namely, an animal stands in a 
certain relation to everything in time as well as space. Thus, an affordance can be an 
infinite disjunctive. A stair affords sitting on and stepping on and licking and punching 
and kicking (this sequence can be repeated an infinite amount of times). If we consider 
certain social contexts as directly perceivable, then a slow pitch in baseball affords 
extending the batters arms and swinging the bat and hitting a home run and winning the 
game and becoming a sports legend. It is not clear where an affordance begins and 
where it ends in space nor when it begins and when it ends in time. The shortcomings 
of these descriptions enable an opportunity to generate a philosophically superior 
description.   
 
5. Affordances as Perceived Events 
 
My claim is that affordances are relational properties of the AES, and that they only 
exist when they are perceived. This description remains consistent with my pragmatic 
motivation for delineating the ontologies put forth by other researchers by standing 
above the rest with respect the how well it may facilitate the acquisition of new 
scientific knowledge. My explicit definition of affordances is forthcoming, but I want 
to begin by detailing what I believe is the essence of this description: That affordances 
are events. 
 
By describing affordances as events, I build on a claims made by Stroffregen (2003) 
that affordances are emergent properties of the AES and Chemero (2011) that they exist 
as relations that obtain between an animal and the environment. Events, not unlike 
emergent properties, come into and out of existence. They are irreducibly temporal and 
durative. If I am to avoid the problems plaguing Chemero and Stroffregen’s 
descriptions, then perhaps an explicit demarcation for when they come into existence 
can be the constraint on scope that is needed. This move also repositions behavior as 
the target of analysis, though still allowing for physics to compliment affordance 
research.  
 
The first step towards this demarcation is to understand that events are fundamentally 
relational in nature. Building on Chemero’s description, they can refer to a relation that 
exists between the animal and the environment. However, the nature of this relation 
cannot simply be complimentary physical dispositions if we are inquiring about 
behavior—we can simply use physics to measure dispositions. I argue that the type of 
relation that must exist is the relation that is engendered when the animal perceives the 
opportunity for action. When the complimentary physical dispositions of the perceiving 
animal and an object in its environment are perceived by the animal to afford it an 
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opportunity for action, then we have the instantiation of an affordance event. This 
description can be modeled by the “property exemplification account” of events (Kim, 
1976). 
 
The property exemplification account of events details a canonical description for what 
it takes for an event to be instantiated. An event has a structure consisting of 
substances(x), a property (P), that occurs at a time (t). Thus, an event (x,P,t) exists 
when a structure has a property at a time. For affordances, the structure is the relation 
of the AES, the property which it possesses is the property of being perceived by the 
animal, and the time is the duration of the perception occurrence. Thus, an affordance 
can be said to exist at any duration when the perception of the opportunity for action is 
experience by the animal that can act on it. Because the structure element of the event is 
the relation between the animal and the environment, this description can include more 
than one perceived opportunity for action at a time. Here is an explicit definition that is 
consistent with my view: 
 
An affordance is a behavior influencing event constituted by the structure of the 
animal-environment system and the perception of the complementary physical 
dispositions of the environment and the perceiving animal. 
 
6. Concluding Thoughts 
 
This description is Gibsonian at heart for several reasons. As an event, it refers to 
something in the AES that no other term does. Because it consists of physical properties 
and perceptions, it is both physical and psychical—yet neither because it is an event 
consisting of a structure—and also cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective. 
As a structure, it points both toward the animal—an object’s causal properties that 
specifies information in medium of the animal that it senses—and towards the 
environment—the causal properties of the animal’s body to act on the object. It 
provides for the animal a causal mechanism that influences behavior. It concerns 
behavior and can be detected in the lab, therefore consistent with Gibson’s enthusiasm 
for experimentation. Furthermore, this description is not plagued by problems of scope. 
The possibility of the infinite disjunctive is eliminated, and replaced only with the 
opportunities for action that are immediately available to the organism’s perception. 
Affordances as events is a promising description that limits the amount of information 
researchers have to account for and compliments the empirical endeavors of scientists 
employing the term in the lab. 
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